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 ABSTRACT 
In this paper we examine the effect of law on foreign direct investment outflows with 
a specific interest in the relationship between international investment law and 
domestic private property laws. Our results indicate that FDI investor is indifferent to 
host country property rights, hence shareholder protection by law is not a significant 
determinant of FDI outflows. We argue that FDI, in contrast with other types of 
capital flows, can effectively mitigate the agency problem through majority 
ownership and control, hence reduce exposure to ex-post expropriation by the 
affiliate. On the other hand, FDI investor remains exposed to risk of expropriation by 
the host government and is strongly sensitive to the enforcement of law in the host 
country. In contrast with recent literature we conclude that there are no causal 
relationship between bilateral investment treaties and FDI. 
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1 Introduction   
The aim of this paper is to provide insight into the role played by international and 
domestic legal institutions in explaining patterns of bilateral foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows. North (1981) defines institutions as a set of rules, compliance 
procedures, and norms designed to constrain the behaviour of the individual. Law 
and legal system is an indispensible part of a host country’s institutions that protect 
private property rights of an investor. In return property rights protects the security 
of returns to investment and assets thereby making it possible for an economic 
activity to be undertaken. La Porta et al (1997, 1998) and Levine (2005) argue that 
law, property rights and contracting are inseparable. Ultimately the strength of 
property rights in a country is determined by a legal environment both conducive to 
private contracting and limiting government expropriation (Levine, 2005).    
Enforcement of laws and rules, by courts or market regulators, to protect the private 
investors is also important1. La Porta et al (1998) argue that enforcement of legal 
rules are important and can sometimes substitute for weak rules. In return legal 
rules and their enforcement can have a positive effect in attracting FDI through their 
effect on reducing information asymmetries for the foreign investor and also 
indirectly through providing more liquid and broad local financial markets. Lerner 
and Schoar (2005) find empirical evidence that differences in legal enforcement of 
contracts in developing countries can explain variations in private equity 
transactions. Particularly they highlight that transaction in high enforcement 
countries have higher valuations and returns. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) show 
that high enforcement countries have broader and more valuable capital markets, 
more public offerings and other indicators of financial development as well.  Antras 
(2011) argues that in international trade imperfect contract enforcement can have a 
detrimental effect2. Especially in the case of global production networks, the 
contracting relationship involves agents operating in different legal systems and 
contracting institutions. As Antras (2011) states “a natural difficulty in resolution of 
disputes involving international transactions is determining which country’s laws are 
applicable to the contract being signed”.    
There are few studies that examine the impact of legal institutions on international 
capital flows 3.  Papaioannou (2005) show that well-functioning institutions are a key 
driving force for international bank flows. He finds that foreign banks invest in 
countries with high-quality legal system and incorrupt bureaucracies. Alfaro et al 
(2008) argue that weak property rights due to poor institutions can lead to lack of 
productive capacities or uncertainty of returns in an economy. Thus institutional 
                                               
1 The rules that protect investors can be found in company, competition, bankruptcy laws, as 
well as stock exchange regulations and accounting standards (La Porta et al, 2000).   
2 There is an influential literature explaining the relationship between property rights, 
incomplete contracts and boundaries of the firm that are first framed by Grossman and Hart 
(1986) and later developed by Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995). See Antras (2011) for a 
survey and an extension of these theories in an international context.   
3 In a recent survey of literature on the determinants of bilateral FDI flows, Blonigen and Piger 
(2011) find that while standard gravity variables, as well as variables controlling for cultural 
proximity are commonly included among location determinants of bilateral FDI flows, host 
country institutions are not part of the standard set. 
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weaknesses create a wedge between expected returns and ex post returns. They find 
that domestic legal institutions have a direct effect on foreign investment. While 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) find that the quality of legal systems is not a significant 
explanatory factor for the location of US affiliates, Lane and Milessi-Ferretti (2008) 
find that sharing a common legal origin is significantly correlated with bilateral 
portfolio holdings.  
In addition to domestic laws international investment law also plays an important 
role in the protection of property rights of the foreign investor. According to the 
widely acknowledged rule in international investment law the property of foreign 
investors cannot be expropriated without compensation (OECD, 2004). However, in 
the absence of a multilateral investment agreement developed countries have been 
demanding that developing countries sign bilateral investment treaties (BIT). Bilateral 
investment treaties can help reduce legal uncertainty, especially in case of 
expropriation, by providing arbitration at the International Court of Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) instead of domestic courts. Bilateral investment 
agreements have been signed at an equally increasing rate as the growth rate in FDI 
flows 4. There is small but increasing number of studies on the impact of BITs within 
trade-related FDI literature. Overall this literature is inconclusive: While several 
studies indicate that the relationship between BITs and FDI is positive and 
statistically significant (e.g. Busse et al, 2008; Egger and Pfafferamayr, 2004; 
Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Salacuse and Sullivan 2004), several others either find a 
negative or no statistically significant relationship (e.g. Aisbett, 2008; Hallward-
Driemeier, 2003 and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 2004). To the best of our 
knowledge, these studies do not take into account the host country private property 
rights.   
The current wave of globalization is driven by large international capital flows that 
have outpaced growth in merchandise trade and output. One of the most salient 
features of this wave is the increasing financial integration of developing countries 
into international capital markets. It is indeed a stylized fact that developing 
countries have been receiving increasing amounts of private capital flows, especially 
in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) since the late-1980s. Despite the 
increasing financial integration of the developing countries, the Lucas paradox 
prevails. Lucas (1990) argued that if the assumptions of the neoclassical model were 
true, all capital should flow from rich to poor countries. In practice, international 
capital flows from rich countries are directed only toward a few select better 
performing developing countries, while majority of international capital flows are 
among the developed countries. Understanding why some countries attract more 
investment than others is therefore highly relevant to developing countries that need 
to rely on external finance to achieve long-term growth.    
This study is motivated to fill the gap in the international capital flows and foreign 
direct investment literature by empirically testing the role played by law5. The quality 
of legal institutions is crucial for contract enforcement and resolution of disputes 
                                               
4 Historically BITs were signed between developed and developing countries, but since the 
1990s, more and more BITs are signed between developing countries themselves. 
5 FDI, although closely related to international trade, does increasingly involve financial 
transactions for e.g. in the form of intra-company loans. 
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involving international transactions not only in goods and services but also in assets. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between domestic and 
international law and their impact on FDI outflows. What is the impact of host 
country property rights on FDI flows?6 Do international investment agreements have 
a positive effect on FDI outflows?  Can weak domestic private property rights explain 
the reason why developed and developing countries sign BITs? To the best of our 
knowledge the interaction between international and domestic law and their impact 
on FDI was not addressed before. These questions are relevant for several fields in 
economics including international macroeconomics, international finance and 
property rights.   
Our results indicate that FDI investor is indifferent to local property rights, hence the 
contracting environment is not a significant determinant of FDI outflows. This result 
is in contradiction with other empirical studies that examined bilateral bank flows 
and equity investment. We argue that FDI is different compared to other types of 
capital flows as the investor can indeed mitigate the post-establishment 
expropriation risk by the affiliate through majority ownership and control. On the 
other hand, FDI investor remains exposed to risk of expropriation by the host 
government and is strongly sensitive to the enforcement of law in the host country. 
Hence it is not the quality of the contracting environment in statutes or case law that 
matter but it is their enforcement. Due to irreversibility of FDI, expropriation both in 
its traditional form of outright nationalization and its new regulatory form (e.g. a 
change in tax policy, or reneging on the incentives offered) affects FDI far more 
adversely than other types of capital flows 7. Hence our most important empirical 
finding is that, contrary to Lucas’ (1990) argument, sovereign expropriation risk is 
still relevant today and BITs are treaty-based instruments signed to overcome such 
capital market imperfections. On a minor note, we did not find evidence of an 
interaction between BITs and the domestic contracting environment, i.e. domestic 
private property rights. Our results neither support the argument that BITs 
complement host country property rights, nor that they are substitutes. 
Nevertheless, we find that bilateral investment treaties alleviate the sovereign 
expropriation risk in civil law countries, and hence help attract FDI, but there is no 
evidence in our sample the same holds true for common law countries.  
In the next section we discuss the policy issues of relevance to the legal governance 
of international capital flows. In section 3 we discuss our theoretical set-up and the 
details of bilateral investment treaties. Section 4 introduces our methodology, and 
section 5 presents our empirical findings. Section 6 presents our conclusions.    
                                               
6 Conceptually, shareholder rights represent the most relevant component of private property 
rights that might affect FDI flows. Hence we use these two terms interchangeably throughout 
this paper.   
7 See e.g. Asiedu et al (2009). 
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2 Policy Issues: International Capital Flows, Legal Institutions and 
Governance   
The financial integration of emerging market economies started in the 1970s as a 
result of a dramatic surge in international capital mobility in response to the oil 
shock of 1973-1974, as well as the growth of the Eurodollar market (Kaminsky, 
2005). International capital flows to emerging markets increased, as syndicated bank 
lending became available during 1979-1981 mainly to Latin America, a period that 
ended abruptly because of unprecedented real interest rate hikes. After a period of 
exclusion from global capital markets, international capital flows resumed in the late 
1980s as several emerging market economies went through structural reform 
processes and liberalization of their capital accounts. In contrast with the bank 
lending of 1970s and early1980s, the current surge in international capital mobility 
we observe since the early 1990s is driven mainly by private flows, in the form of 
foreign direct investment and portfolio investment to Latin America, Asia and 
transition economies. This change in the structure of developing country external 
finance was welcome because equity flows offer more risk-sharing than debt-creating 
flows (Rogoff, 1999; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001) to the host economy.    
The financial integration of emerging market economies is partly due to capital 
account liberalization and decreasing regulatory barriers to international capital 
flows, a policy promoted by Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement and the OECD 
Code of Liberalization of Capital Account. The idea was that, similar to the welfare 
gains arguments from trade liberalization, capital account liberalization would lead 
to long-term growth through access to finance, efficient allocation of capital and 
consumption smoothing. Even though the empirical evidence on the growth 
promoting effects of international capital flows is inconclusive (see e.g. Rodrik 
(1998) and Bhagwati (1998) for a negative assessment; e.g. Henry (2007) and 
Frankel (2010) arguing that capital account liberalization can enhance long-term 
growth prospects) the recent crisis draw attention more to the need to regulate 
international capital flows. 
A recent study by IMF (2010) argues that, even though the international capital flows 
have become the main channel for transmission of shocks, there is lack of clear 
understanding about who is institutionally responsible for financial stability. Unlike 
the WTO that have established rules for trade in goods and services, there are no 
established rules for international capital flows. Under the current structure, the IMF 
is responsible for global monetary cross-border transactions, but the most important 
obligations in its Articles of Agreement are relevant for current not for capital 
account transactions. Furthermore, while Article IV states that the purpose of the 
international monetary system is to enable exchange of capital among countries, 
Article VI permits recourse to capital controls as long as they do not interfere with 
current account payments (Akyuz and Cornford, 1999).    
In 1995 OECD initiated talks for a Multilateral Investment Agreement with the aim to 
liberalize investment and to establish binding dispute settlement procedures 
(Hoekmand and Saggi, 2000). This initiative did not take off and talks ended in 1998 
with OECD countries agreeing on a package far less reaching than bilateral 
investment treaties (Sauve, 1998). At the WTO Ministerial in Singapore in 1996 a 
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working group was formed to discuss trade and investment, however, negotiations 
failed due to opposition by developing countries. As a result developed countries 
started signing bilateral investment treaties with developing countries at an 
increasing rate almost in par with the growth in FDI flows (see Figure 1)8. In 
summary, current legal governance for international capital flows liberalization is 
based on several international agreement with different objectives and scope such as 
OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), and 
between over 2,000 BITs and regional investment treaties or free trade agreements 
(FTA) with investment chapters such as NAFTA (IMF, 2010).  While most scholars 
focus on the increasing role played by FDI as a more reliable source of external 
finance for developing countries, only a select group of developing countries, i.e. 
emerging market economies, have successfully integrated into the FDI market. As 
the failed attempts for a multilateral investment agreement, both at the OECD and 
WTO level, shows that not all developing countries are interested in attracting FDI 
(Hoekman and Saggi, 2001).    
The proliferation of bilateral investment agreements presents increasing challenge to 
the institutions (i.e. IMF and the OECD) in two distinct but not mutually exclusive 
aspects: for the general i) liberalization and ii) governance of international capital 
flows. The general stated purpose of BITs is to promote and protect investment. In 
order to do so, a typical BIT offers post-establishment ‘national’ and Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) treatment to the foreign investor, and once established, BIT liberalizes 
capital account transactions pursuant to the ‘investment’. Specifically, the 
Contracting parties are obliged to permit free transfer of payments including inflows 
such as additional equity flows for the expansion of the investment, or 
compensation of management and outflows such as repatriation of profits, 
repayment of loans, proceeds from disinvestment, and compensation for any loss 
and damage. In other words, while BITs offer post-establishment liberalization, they 
restrict the sovereign rights of the Contracting party to regulate i.e. to control capital 
flows. As the aim of this study is to empirically test the effect of legal institutions 
and governance on FDI, our results contribute to policy discussions on legal 
governance of international capital flows.    
                                               
8 Today bilateral investment treaties are increasingly signed between developing countries as 
well. 
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3 Theoretical background   
There are two types of risk that a FDI investor faces: 1) risk of expropriation by 
management 2) sovereign expropriation risk by the host state. Grossman and Hart 
(1986), and Hart and Moore (1990) show that ownership structure affects parties’ 
exposure to expropriation and the hold-up problem as ownership of an asset gives 
the owner the right to determine the use of the asset that is by its nature not fully 
contractible: integration by FDI can alleviate this problem as FDI combines ownership 
and control, especially in the case of majority-ownership. Empirical evidence shows 
that majority-ownership of the foreign affiliate seems to be the norm rather than an 
exception for US parent firms (see Table 1) and this is true regardless of level of 
development of the host country. According to the incomplete contracting theory 
(e.g. Antras and Helpman (2008)), the degree to which an investment project is 
contractible is an important determinant of foreign firms’ decision to invest. Another 
manner in which expropriation can arise is when there is the classic agency problem: 
when the agent (affiliate) uses the profits to benefit themselves rather than return 
them to the principle (parent company)9. This type of expropriation may arise in the 
post-establishment period due to information asymmetries. The rights of the 
investors in either case are defined and protected by the legal system. 
Law and finance literature argues that law, property rights and contracting are 
inseparable (La Porta et al (1997, 1998); Levine (2005)). La Porta et al (1996) show 
that common law countries give shareholders and creditors relatively the strongest 
protection and French civil law countries the weakest. On the other hand German 
and Scandinavian civil law countries offer the highest quality of law enforcement. 
According to La Porta et al (1996) in countries with weak property rights, investors 
have to be large to stand up to the management and to extract payments from them. 
If this holds true we would expect to see larger shares of capital flows in the form of 
FDI in host states with weak property and shareholder rights. Hausmann and 
Fernandez-Arias (2000) find that contrary to expectations, the share of FDI is higher 
in countries with under-developed financial markets, higher risk and weaker 
institutions.    
The quality of legal systems in the host country is also closely related to sovereign 
expropriation risk. The law and finance literature argue that historically British 
common law developed as a law of private property, whereas the French civil law 
developed to give more emphasis on the rights of state and less on private property 
rights (Levine, 2005). La Porta et al (1999) argue that civil law can be a proxy for 
building institutions to further the power of the state. From this perspective, civil law 
countries would have difficulty credibly committing not to interfere with private 
contracts. In other words, under domestic legal systems with a tradition for weak 
protection of private property, a government is often tempted by dynamic 
inconsistencies of its policies. As international capital markets are prone to ‘inherent 
imperfections’ the ability of the government to implement its contractual obligations 
suffer from a credibility problem. As Kydland and Prescott (1977) argued in their 
seminal work many economic policy decisions are subject to dynamic inconsistency 
                                               
9 The definition of the agency problem can be found in Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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problems: FDI investor knows that once established in the host economy, the 
government will re-optimize its policies at a later date and renege on its contract. 
Hence expropriation, both in its traditional and regulatory form, is an example of 
time inconsistency of economic policy. When the host state cannot credibly protect 
FDI, the investor demands that the host state sign a bilateral investment treaty and 
give up its sovereign power to make discretionary policies in the future.   
In this paper we argue that the existence of large number of BITs in force is a sign 
that sovereign risk in the form of expropriation is still relevant today. Only the 
nature of expropriation has changed over the last decades. Disputes on direct 
expropriation for e.g. the overt nationalization cases seen in Latin America in the 
1970s and 1980s have been replaced by disputes regarding foreign direct 
investment regulation and ‘indirect expropriation’ (OECD, 2004)10. For example, in 
the Tecmed S. A. vs Mexico case (2003), the International Court for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) awarded actual findings of expropriation because 
Mexico revoked the operating license of the US company. Similarly, ICSID also 
decided in the Metclad vs Mexico case (2000) that denial of a construction permit 
contrary to prior assurances constituted expropriation.    
In addition to these changes in the context of expropriation, the asymmetry of 
international capital flows increases the likelihood of expropriation. Developed-to-
developed capital flows are characterized by two-way large gross flows. On the other 
hand developed-to-developing country flows are characterized by large gross flows 
from developed to developing countries but small gross flows from developing to 
developed countries. This implies in the absence of a BIT signed by a developed and 
developing country, that retaliation is not an option in case of expropriation either11. 
Bergstrand and Egger (2011) analyze systematically the determinants of BITs12. 
Besides a set of variables that are commonly used as determinants of FDI, they find 
that higher risk of expropriation is positively correlated with the probability of 
signing a BIT, and that the impact of expropriation is direct on the likelihood of a 
BIT. On the other hand, Aisbett (2009) finds empirical evidence that reduced 
expropriation risk increases participation in BITs with OECD countries. In the next 
section, we explain how BITs are supposed to function to promote and protect 
investment.   
3.1 Bilateral investment treaties and domestic legal institutions   
While private property rights and contracting are closely related to shareholder and 
creditor rights in the host country, bilateral investment agreements and international 
investment law provide protection against expropriation by the state. In this section 
we start with a detailed explanation of the function of a BIT and its connection with 
                                               
10 Indirect expropriation refers to regulatory measures to protect health, environment and 
other welfare interests of society (OECD, 2004). 
11 Eaton and Gersovitz (1983) introduced the reputation effect expropriation has on future 
investment but they do not consider enforcement. 
12Bergstrand and Egger (2011) refer to an earlier empirical study by Swenson (2005) that 
explains the cumulative number of BITs across-countries by income, expropriation risk and 
stock of FDI in previous periods.   
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the domestic legal system. Bilateral investment treaties are signed between two 
sovereign states (i.e. Contracting Party) to promote and protect investment. Even 
though three quarters of global FDI are two-way flows among developed countries, 
these flows are not covered under any BIT13. Instead BITs are signed between capital-
exporting developed and capital-importing developing countries reflecting power 
asymmetries. According to the ‘power asymmetry’ hypothesis of the political 
economy literature, investment agreements oppose these two groups: the few 
capital-exporting countries want to protect their investment through international 
law, whereas a large number of capital-importing countries want to protect their 
sovereignty (Morin and Gagne, 2007).   
The typical BIT starts by defining the ‘investment’ and ‘investor’ that are covered. 
Even though the majority BITs do not use the conventional definition of FDI, with 
reference to 10 percent equity ownership threshold, legal scholars agree that BITs 
refer to FDI flows only (Vandevelde, 2010)14. Unlike regional trade agreements, BITs 
did not set out to ‘liberalize’ investment15. Majority of BITs state that Contracting 
parties “shall encourage and create favourable conditions for investors”, but the 
admission of such investment is “subject to the right to exercise powers conferred 
by its laws’. Majority of BITs accept FDI conditional upon the fulfilment of national 
admission procedures. Once established, the BITs ensure that the foreign investor is 
treated fairly and equitably, as a domestic investor or any other foreign investor. 
This clause is standard in almost all BITs and this is why BITs and domestic legal 
systems are inextricably connected.    
These provisions give equal legal rights to foreign investors as domestic investors in 
the case of an investor-investor dispute in the post-establishment period. While 
majority BITs fall under this category (e.g. EU member state BITs), US BITs and recent 
Canada BITs can be interpreted to be granting pre-establishment rights to foreign 
investors, a provision that is seen to be FDI liberalizing as they offer ‘national 
treatment’ at the admission stage (OECD, 2004). As over 1,500 of existing BITs are 
signed by EU member states vs only 48 by the US, we claim that FDI liberalizing 
effect of BITs are limited globally.   
In case of a dispute between an investor and state, the investor can resort to 
arbitration at the International Court for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
usually if the investor is not confident of a fair and equitable outcome had it tried to 
settle the dispute in the national courts of the host country. Today it is a widely 
acknowledged rule in international investment law that the property of foreign 
investors cannot be expropriated without compensation. However, in the absence of 
a BIT between the partners, international investment law leaves the decision on 
                                               
13 One exception is NAFTA that includes a chapter on investment, that is practically a bilateral 
investment agreement. NAFTA was used as a basis of a ICSID case filed in 2007 by a US 
petroleum company against Canada. 
14 Austria-India BIT (2001) is an exception that covers at least 51 percent of shares or voting 
rights. 
15 Our results indicate that the impact of BITs are smaller in magnitude of the treatment effect 
of FTAs (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). 
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compensation to the courts of the host state16. Inarguably economically the most 
important provision of BITs are provisions on compensation in case of expropriation 
and investor to state dispute settlement mechanism17. So far there have been 363 
registered cases at the ICSID where majority of the respondents were Latin American 
sovereign states. The fact that there are several BITs signed between OECD member 
states, i.e. between developed and emerging market and transition economies, 
supports the argument that BITs provide a far stronger legal governance compared 
to the OECD Code thanks to the dispute settlement clause18.    
While studies using international capital flows find a statistically significant 
relationship between international investment and legal institutions of a host 
country, they do not take into account the presence of bilateral investment treaties. 
On the other hand, foreign direct investment literature focuses on the impact of BITs 
but does not formally address the quality of legal institutions in the host country. In 
the next section we introduce our methodology to address the research questions 
outlined in the introduction, specifically identifying the channels through which BITs 
work.   
                                               
16 The ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation for the expropriation of foreign 
investment is known as the ‘Hull formula’ and was endorsed by several developed countries. 
In contrast, in the 1960s and 1970s the developing countries supported the Calvo doctrine, an 
economic policy that claims that jurisdiction in international investment disputes lies with the 
country where the investment is made. Under this doctrine, a foreign investor cannot appeal 
for help from his home country as this would violate territorial sovereignty and judicial 
independence of the host countries. Even though the UN General Assembly resolution rejected 
the Hull formula in favor of the Calvo doctrine, the Hull formula is often used and accepted as 
part of the international customary law (OECD, 2004). 
17 There is usually an additional chapter on compensation for losses in case of war, armed 
conflict, revolution, national state of emergency, etc. that is separate from compensation of 
losses resulting from expropriation. 
18 The OECD Code is constituted by legally binding rules, but the implementation of 
obligations by each member state is enforced by peer-pressure. 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Model 
We adopt a modified gravity model to estimate the bilateral FDI flows. Gravity 
models are increasingly used to explain bilateral patterns of international capital 
flows as well as bilateral trade flows (e.g. Wei (2000), Martin and Rey (2000), Portes 
and Rey (2005), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004; 2008)). We estimate the following 
equation on a panel dataset of 18 OECD countries and 24 emerging market 
economies over the period 1992-2007.    
ln(FDI)
ijt
 = α
ij
 + δBIT
ijt
 + X
jt
 + t
t 
+ η
jt 
+ e
ijt
    (1)  
The dependent variable is the natural log of real bilateral FDI outflows from 
developed country i to developing country j at time t. To estimate the average 
treatment effect of the BITs , we use four-year non-overlapping averages of bilateral 
FDI outflows as dependent variable. This helps mitigate the potential problem of 
serial correlation and hence ‘spurious regression problem’ as noted by Wooldridge 
(2002) when using fixed-effects estimator on panel datasets with T>2. The 
dependent variable is regressed on a BIT dummy variable that takes on the value of 
1 if a BIT is in force, and zero otherwise. Out of 432 country-pairs, 167 country-pairs 
have signed a BIT sometime during 1992-2007. We use a set of control variables that 
are commonly used in literature. In our benchmark model to control for the size of 
the host country market we use natural log of real GDP of the host economy. We also 
use the log of real market capitalization of listed companies in the host country as a 
proxy for the development of the stock markets19. Claessens et al (2001) find a 
positive correlation between stock market capitalization and FDI. In all estimations 
we include country-pair fixed-effects, time dummies and source country- time 
dummies. While country-pair fixed effects control for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity, source country-time dummies control for unobserved time-varying 
heterogeneity in the source country. We use time dummies to control for global 
shocks that affect FDI outflows for each country-pair in a similar fashion and help us 
remove panel-wide heteroscedasticity (Roodman, 2008). In all tables we report 
robust standard errors.    
4.2 Endogeneity    
Following the recent study by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) we estimate the average 
treatment effect of BITs on foreign direct investment flows using a panel approach 
and estimate our model with a fixed-effects estimator. It is unlikely that BITs signed 
between two countries are exogenous random variables and more plausible that 
countries select into BITs for reasons that are unobservable and maybe correlated 
with the levels of FDI. Estimation of the partial effects of an endogenous binary 
variable (BIT) on a continuous endogenous variable (FDI flows) falls under the 
category of treatment effect literature in econometrics (Baier and Bergstrand 2007). 
                                               
19 All real variables are deflated using the US GDP deflator (base=2000). 
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Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest using fixed-effects panel estimator instead of 
the IV estimator as the coefficients estimated using this method are only consistent 
if there is no reverse causality (Heckman, 1997), i.e. that the decision of a country to 
sign a BIT with a developing country is unrelated to unobservable factors that 
influence FDI outflows. In addition, it is difficult to find a good instrument for BITs.    
So in contrast with most of the earlier literature on BITs, we control for endogeneity 
of BITs. Wooldridge (2000) suggests that in the presence of unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity, using panel data is preferable to cross-section estimation of 
the treatment effects. Models estimated with country-pair fixed-effects (αij) are 
shown to effectively eliminate the selection (omitted variable) bias (e.g. Razin et al 
2003, Helpman et al, 2005) due to time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity. Only a 
few trade-related FDI studies acknowledge and control the endogeneity of BITs 
(Egger and Pfafferamayr (2004) and Busse et al (2008) find a statistically robust and 
positive effect of BITs on FDI, Aisbett (2009) finds that the strong correlation 
between BIT adoption and FDI outflows disappears when endogeneity is controlled 
for). In addition, we control for endogeneity that may arise due to time-varying 
country specific unobservables and augment our model by country- and time-effects 
(i.e. γ
it
 and η
jt
), similar to the multilateral resistance terms in theoretically motivated 
gravity models.    
4.3 Empirical strategy  
Our main objective in our empirical analysis is first to establish the impact of BITs on 
FDI outflows and then examine the impact of domestic legal institutions and their 
interaction with BITs. In the first part of our empirical strategy we try to establish the 
robustness of the BITs to the inclusion of a large number of explanatory variables. 
We group these explanatory variables as macroeconomic factors and unilateral 
liberalization in host countries. Among macroeconomic factors we control for real 
GDP per capita income, GDP growth and inflation rates. As most emerging market 
countries went through structural reform processes during the sample period, the 
macroeconomic fundamentals improved in the 1990s during the surge in FDI flows. 
The FDI literature (e.g. Head and Ries, 2008; Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Chakrabarti, 
2001) shows that FDI is attracted to host countries with higher per capita income 
and growth rates. In contrast, high level of inflation is a sign for instability of the 
domestic economy and a source of uncertainty for future returns to investment. In 
short, we would expect to have positive correlation between FDI outflows and host 
country income and growth rates and negative correlation with inflation rates. Finally 
we use log of the level of imports to proxy for information sharing and bilateral 
trust. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) show in a theoretical model (log of) imports can 
perfectly capture the impact of transport costs and consumer preferences on 
bilateral equity holdings and use bilateral trade to proxy for information sharing that 
can reduce financial frictions in their empirical analysis. Bilateral trade flows can also 
be a proxy for bilateral trust between countries. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) 
show that higher bilateral trust between two countries is associated with more trade 
between the countries. In addition, this effect is stronger for more trust intensive 
goods. If trust is established between two countries through trade flows, it is more 
likely that other types of capital flows also follow.   
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The next step is to isolate the effect of unilateral liberalization that might have an 
effect on FDI environment from the marginal effect of BITs. First, to control for de 
jure financial openness of the host country we use the Chinn-Ito (2008) index of 
capital account openness: the index ranges between 2.5 (most financially open) to -
1.84 (least financially open)20. As emerging market economies all went through 
capital account liberalization in the 1990s, it is important to control for unilateral 
capital account liberalization in the host country. Another control that is used to 
account for liberalization in the host economy is the process of privatization. As 
several transition economies went through large privatization projects in the 1990s, 
the sale of state-owned assets provided an opportunity to attract large sums of FDI 
inflows as well as signalling a transition to market economy. We use the log of 
privatization proceeds in USD to isolate the effect of privatization from the effect of 
BITs. Next we introduce a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the source and host 
country have signed a regional trade agreement. Several EU member states have 
signed BITs around the time of signature of regional trade agreements, for e.g. with 
Chile (2002) and Mexico (2000). In the case of EU-Chile and EU-Mexico Association 
Agreements, the regional trade agreements not only liberalized trade in goods but 
also trade and FDI in services, movement of capital flows and strengthened the 
protection of intellectual property rights21. Finally we use an index of political 
liberalization that ranges between -10 (autocracies) to +10 (consolidated 
democracies) to control for the effect of democratization.    
In the second part, we isolate the effect of domestic legal institutions with respect to 
property rights from the marginal effect of BITs on FDI. First we investigate whether 
countries with weak legal protection for property rights attract more or less FDI 
flows. Here we use the legal origin as a proxy for the quality of legal institutions and 
property rights of the host country as developed by La Porta et al (2005) and identify 
countries as Common, French and German civil law countries (Table 2)22. 
Theoretically, the effect of weak legal institutions on FDI may be either positive or 
negative as outlined in section 3. Second, we examine the effect of sharing common 
legal origin as institutional similarity may have a positive effect on FDI flows as well 
as equity holdings (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008). Finally, we investigate whether 
BITs substitute for weak domestic legal protection of property rights or not. 
                                               
20 The Chinn-Ito index codifies the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial 
transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). 
21 Similar to NAFTA, these free trade agreements did not just liberalize trade but also 
investment, public procurement and trade in services. 
22 There are no Scandinavian civil law origin developing countries. 
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5 Results   
5.1 Bilateral investment treaties and FDI   
In the first part of our empirical analysis we find a robust and positive effect between 
BITs and FDI outflows from developed to emerging market economies. In Tables 3-5 
we estimate several different specification of our baseline specification (in Table 3 
column 1) with a fixed-effects estimator. As in standard gravity models we augment 
our model by including several host country specific variables as well as country-pair 
specific variables controlling for macroeconomic variables and unilateral 
liberalization policies that may affect FDI flows. Variables that are commonly used to 
control for information costs and information frictions such as bilateral distance, 
sharing a common language and common border are captured by the country-pair 
fixed-effects. We also augment our baseline specification to include source-country 
time dummies to control for endogeneity that may arise from time-varying source-
country heterogeneity23. In Table 3 columns 2-4 we introduce real GDP per capita, 
GDP growth and inflation rate individually and all together in column 5. The 
coefficient of the BIT dummy ranges from 0.27 to 0.41 corresponding to an average 
treatment effect (ATE) of 31 percent to 51 percent increase in average FDI outflows 
after a BIT enters into force. The size variables real GDP and market capitalization of 
the host are statistically significant except when GDP per capita is included in the 
specification. GDP per capita, growth and inflation rates are not significant 
determinants of FDI outflows, however BIT dummy is robust to their inclusion in the 
model.   
In Table 4 column 1-5 we isolate the effect of several measures of unilateral 
liberalizations that might have an impact on FDI flows. As discussed above financial 
liberalization index measures the capital account openness of the host country and a 
priori we expect this variable to have a positive impact on FDI inflows. With the 
exception of democratization index, privatization, regional trade agreements and log 
of imports are expected to be positively correlated with FDI. The theoretical impact 
of democratic institutions on FDI is ambiguous. On the one hand democratic 
institutions may encourage FDI as they lower the risk of discretionary policies, such 
as expropriation or contract repudiation (Li 2009). On the other hand, FDI investors 
may prefer autocratic host countries as they may find it easier to collect their 
oligopolistic or monopolistic rents (Li and Resnick 2003)24. Again the most important 
result in Table 4 is that BIT dummy is statistically significant and robust to the 
inclusion of all these policy liberalization variables with ATE ranging from 28 to 32 
percent. Among the unilateral liberalization variables, only privatization and trade 
have a statistically significant and positive effect on FDI. The marginal effect of BIT is 
                                               
23 Using source-country time dummies can control for several source-country characteristics 
that may have an impact on FDI outflows such as changes in exchange and interest rates. 
These dummies also bring our model closer to a theoretically motivated gravity model as per 
Anderson  and van Wincoop (2003) by including multilateral resistance terms. 
24 Asiedu and Lien (2010) show in an empirical study that when natural resource endowment 
of the host country is less than a critical threshold, democracy encourages FDI, otherwise 
democracy decreases FDI in natural resource rich countries. 
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statistically significant and positive even when we control for large privatization 
periods and trade flows.    
In Table 5 we test the sensitivity of the coefficient of the BIT dummy to a subsample 
of host countries and their BITs. For example, several host countries in our sample 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania) have 
become a member of the European Union, a process that required these countries to 
align their laws with the EU acquis in order to achieve removal of regulatory barriers 
and join the single market. Before these countries joined the EU, several old EU 
member states, US and other developed countries have signed BITs with the new EU 
member states that are still in force. In Table 5 column 1 we introduce a EU 
membership dummy variable as well as an interaction term to control for the 
conditional impact of a BIT given that the host country is a EU member. Our results 
indicate that EU membership is not a statistically significant determinant of FDI in 
our sample and BIT dummy is robust to the inclusion of the EU dummy. Several host 
countries in our sample are also OECD members and that might have an impact on 
FDI attractiveness of these countries. It is interesting to note that several recent 
OECD members (e.g. Czech Republic (1995) Hungary (1996) Korea (1996) Mexico 
(1994) Poland (1996) Slovak Republic (2000)) continued to sign BITs after signing the 
Convention on the OECD. In column 2 we examine whether our results are driven by 
the smaller group of OECD-member emerging market countries and their BITs with 
other OECD members. There is no evidence in our sample that our previous results 
are driven by these host countries in our sample. Finally we introduce a US dummy 
variable and an interaction term of BIT signed by the US to control for the potential 
FDI liberalizing effect of US BITs as discussed above. We do not find any evidence 
that US BITs have any effect on FDI25. Again we find that the BIT dummy is 
statistically significant and its economic significance is robust to these sensitivity 
checks.   
As a final robustness test, we introduce both source country and host country-time 
dummies, much as the multilateral resistance terms in theoretically motivated 
gravity models. Hence in Table 6 column 1 we regress log of average FDI outflows on 
the BIT dummy variable, bilateral fixed effects and source- and host-time dummy 
variables. According to theory, only when time-varying heterogeneity is controlled 
for, as well as bilateral fixed-effects, we can obtain an unbiased ATE of the BIT 
dummy. Our results indicate that controlling for potential endogeneity that may arise 
due to time-invariant and time-varying heterogeneity (including real GDPs), BIT 
dummy has a statistically significant ATE indicating that signing a BIT increases FDI 
outflows by 30 percent (e 0.26 -1= 1.30). This estimate is not much different than our 
baseline estimate in Table 3 column 1. In column 2, we introduce a lagged BIT 
dummy to control for anticipation effects: even though BITs do not have a ‘phasing 
in’ period like the free trade agreements, there is a lag between the time BITs are 
signed and the time they enter actually into force. The anticipation effect is 
statistically significant and negative (-0.45) indicating that the foreign investors have 
been disinvesting before the BIT comes into force. However, once the BIT is in force 
there is a strong positive effect (0.65) on FDI inflows. The total ATE of the BIT is the 
sum of statistically significant coefficients, i.e. 0.20 (0.65-0.45).    
                                               
25 The US dummy is excluded from the regression model due to collinearity. 
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5.2 Domestic legal institutions, BIT and FDI   
As discussed in detail in the theoretical part, in this part of our empirical analysis we 
rely on the literature on law and finance to determine the strength of private 
property rights in the host country. In order to examine the role played by domestic 
legal institutions, especially laws that protect and enforce private property rights, we 
estimate the baseline model controlling legal origin of the host country. As the law 
and finance literature suggests British common law was developed essentially as a 
law of property rights and offers relatively the strongest protection of shareholder 
rights. On the other hand, French civil law offers both the least institutional 
protection and enforcement of these rights. German and Scandinavian civil laws offer 
the best enforcement, however in terms of property rights they fall in between 
common and French civil law.   
As a first step in Table 7 columns 1-3, we examine whether sharing a common legal 
origin has an impact on FDI (i.e. Common vs French and vs German civil law), have 
any impact26. Since legal origin of the host country is time-invariant we estimate an 
augmented version of our baseline model using the random-effects estimator27. Our 
results indicate that there is a positive effect of sharing a common legal origin 
among French civil law countries: sharing French civil law origin increases 
investment by (e 0.45-1) 57 percent in French civil law emerging economies by e.g. 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. This effect is independent of 
the average treatment effect of a BIT, that remains robust to the inclusion of legal 
origin dummy.   
In Table 8, we address the question whether BITs are substitute for weak property 
rights. Hallward-Dremeier (2003) argues that BITs are not substitutes but 
complements for good institutional quality and local property rights. If indeed BITs 
are complements for strong property rights, we would expect to see a positive 
impact of both BITs and domestic legal systems. On the other hand, if BITs 
substitute for weak property rights we would expect to see a statistically 
insignificant impact of BIT on FDI when property rights are controlled for. As 
Hallward-Dreimeier (2003) argues developing countries sign BITs to make up for 
poor quality of institutions. If this is indeed the rationale behind signing BITs, then 
we would expect that the correct marginal effect of BIT should be the sum of the 
coefficient for BIT dummy and the coefficient for an interaction term with legal origin 
(i.e. δ+λ). Similarly, the marginal effect of domestic property rights is the sum of the 
coefficient of the legal origin dummy and the coefficient of the interaction term (i.e. 
λ+φ) as below.   
ln(FDI)
ijt
= α
ij
+δBIT
ijt 
+λBIT
ijt
*legalorigin
j
+ φlegalorigin
j 
+βX
jt
+ t
t
+ η
jt
+e
ijt
   (2)   
                                               
26 We also examined whether the strength of protection of private property rights of the host 
country, as given by its legal origin have an impact on its FDI attractiveness. We did not find 
any statistically significant effect of common or civil law on FDI. Hence our results do not 
support that countries with weak property rights (i.e. countries with civil law origin) attract 
more (or less) FDI flows. 
27 We also estimated the same specifications using fixed-effects with vector decomposition 
estimator of Plumper and Troeger (2007) both on averaged and non-averaged FDI dataset. The 
BIT dummy is the only statistically significant variable in these specifications. 
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Our results indicate that domestic legal origin and hence local property rights do not 
have a statistically significant effect on FDI outflows from developed countries. There 
is also no support for the argument that BITs are signed by host countries with weak 
legal protection for property rights. On the other hand, controlling for domestic 
laws, only in civil law host countries (both French and German) BIT have a significant 
effect on FDI flows. This may be interpreted as BITs encouraging FDI outflows to 
mainly civil law countries. For host countries with common law, there is no evidence 
that BITs increase FDI. In these countries, FDI is mainly attracted to larger domestic 
and financial market size. Overall, there is no evidence in our sample that domestic 
legal institutions have a significant impact on FDI outflows from OECD countries. On 
the other hand sharing a common legal origin increases FDI outflows only for French 
civil law countries. Finally we re-ran all the regressions in this section using share of 
FDI in total capital flows as a dependent variable and all our results remain 
qualitatively the same.    
5.3 FDI and legal governance: Robustness checks   
In the previous section we examined the relationship between FDI and domestic legal 
institutions as identified by the legal origin of the host country. In this section, we 
revert to the effects of legal governance on FDI: in other words we isolate the effect 
of governance from institutions. We define legal governance as the quality with 
which laws are enforced in the host country. La Porta et al (1996) argue that legal 
rules are only one element of investor protection and the enforcement of these rules 
can be equally important, and may even substitute for weak rules. There is now 
extensive literature examining the impact of institutional quality on development 
and long-run growth (see for e.g. Acemoglu et al 2004), and a small but an 
increasing number of studies relating institutional quality to international capital 
flows (e.g. Alfaro et al 2008). There are several measures of institutional quality 
available for a large set of developing countries. In this section we aim to isolate the 
effect of legal governance using proxies for the quality of enforcement of legal 
rights.   
In Table 9, we introduce several indices that measure the perceptions of investors on 
the quality of legal enforcement in the host country. As several of these indices are 
correlated with other variables, notably macroeconomic fundamentals, we introduce 
these variables in the specification used in Table 6 column 1. Column 1 in Table 9 
reproduced the results from Table 6 and in subsequent columns we add our legal 
governance control variables. In column 2, we use an index of property rights that 
measure the degree to which a host country’s laws protect property right and the 
degree to which they are enforced. The index ranges from 0-10, 0 meaning private 
property is outlawed and 10 stands for private property guaranteed by the 
government28. We find that property rights enforcement is not a significant 
determinant of FDI and controlling for this channel the average treatment effect of 
the BIT dummy becomes statistically and economically more significant (0.31).    
                                               
28 This index is one of the subcomponents of the Economic Freedom index of the Heritage 
Foundation. 
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In order to refine our robustness test and to isolate the channels through which BITs 
works, we introduce an index of shareholder rights, as a more precise measure of 
expropriation risk by management. This index that ranges between 0-10 indicates 
that at lower values shareholder rights are poorly implemented and strongly 
implemented when the index increases29. Again, our results confirm that host 
country law, especially those that protect the rights of the shareholder and their 
enforcement do not seem to matter for the FDI investor. Holding shareholder risk 
constant, we find that BITs are still positively correlated with FDI: after signing a BIT, 
FDI increases by 0.65 percent (e 0.50- 1). Hence we rule out that BITs are a substitute 
for domestic property rights, nor are they complements.    
Next we test whether BITs are a substitute for sovereign expropriation risk. In 
column 3 we introduce an index of sovereign risk using Standard & Poor’s Sovereign 
Ratings measuring a central government's willingness and ability to service 
commercial financial obligations on a timely basis. This index is introduced to isolate 
the risk of a sovereign debt default from sovereign expropriation risk. Our results 
indicate, even when we control for sovereign default risk BIT dummy remains 
significant indicating that BITs continue to protect against expropriation risk. On the 
other hand, sovereign risk is a significant determinant of FDI outflows, indicating 
that countries with better risk ratings receive more FDI.    
In columns 4-5 we control for rule of law and the risk of expropriation (of outright 
nationalization) in the host country. These two indices control for legal governance 
and enforcement of rules in the host country. We find that when we control for these 
variables BIT dummy is no longer statistically significant. The rule of law data is from 
Kaufmann et al (2010)- The Worldwide Governance Indicators project and measures 
perceptions of agents in particular the quality of contract enforcement in the host 
country, ranging from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. The risk 
of expropriation data are from PRS Group International Country Risk Guide and it 
measures the legal security of private ownership rights, i.e. risk of confiscation. The 
statistically robust and significant impact of BIT dummy on FDI outflows no longer 
holds true when we control for expropriation risk and rule of law. This result is 
striking as it indicates that indeed BITs are signed to protect against expropriation 
risk and that controlling for rule of law and the risk of confiscation BITs do not have 
any statistically significant effect on FDI flows. In other words the strong ATE of the 
BIT dummy on FDI outflows was due to the correlation between the two variables and 
rule of law, hence it is spurious. 
 
Prior evidence indicating strong statistical and empirical treatment effect of BITs is in 
contradiction with the survey-based evidence as to the lack of knowledge about BITs 
among investors. It is also surprising that several other insurance instruments such 
as MIGA and private political risk insurance co-exist with BITs. According to Poulsen 
(2010) most capital-exporting countries provide political risk insurance in addition to 
BITs, with the exception of a few e.g. Germany and France where government 
guarantee is contingent on signature of a BIT. In addition, only a few private 
                                               
29 This index is from IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook and is based on executive surveys. 
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providers factor BITs into their product. Hence we interpret our results as BITs 
providing less-than-perfect protection for sovereign expropriation risk.   
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6 Conclusions   
In this paper we examine the role of law on foreign direct investment. Foreign direct 
investment has become a significant source of external finance for developing 
countries, especially for several emerging market economies. Understanding the role 
played by legal institutions and governance in attracting international capital flows 
can be significant for the future growth prospects of these countries through further 
financial integration.    
This paper analyzes both the impact of international and domestic investment law on 
FDI. As a strong domestic law and its enforcement are indispensible to the financial 
development of a country, international investment law that protects the foreign 
investor against discretionary policies, e.g. expropriation, of a developing country 
host government is necessary for its financial integration. In addition to this, 
international investment law and domestic commercial laws are connected as the 
international investment law refers the foreign investor to the domestic laws of the 
host country in case of expropriation. In the absence of a multilateral investment 
agreement, several developed countries demand that developing countries sign 
bilateral investment agreements.   
Our results indicate that FDI investor is indifferent to local property rights. This is 
because FDI investor can alleviate the post-establishment expropriation risk by the 
affiliate as FDI combines ownership with control, i.e. majority ownership of the 
foreign affiliate can effectively mitigate the risk of ex-post expropriation by 
management of the affiliate. On the other hand, FDI investor remains exposed to risk 
of expropriation by the host government and is strongly sensitive to the rule 
(enforcement) of law in the host country. We conclude that BITs are not a substitute 
for weak property rights but for sovereign expropriation risk. In addition, BITs have a 
strong and robust positive effect on FDI outflows to civil law countries but not to 
common law countries. This result supports our argument that BITs are signed to 
protect against expropriation risk as civil law historically developed to give more 
power to the state rather than protecting property rights of the individual.    
Our results have significant implications for both literature and policy. As mentioned 
earlier while BITs liberalize FDI inflows and outflows in the post-establishment 
period, they restrict host states' sovereign right to impose capital controls and hence 
have an indirect effect on liberalization of capital flows related to FDI. On the other 
hand, few BITs provide market access, e.g. the recent US and Canada BITs, to foreign 
investors but there is no evidence in our analysis that this type of BIT encourage FDI 
outflows more so than others. Given that there are large regulatory barriers to FDI in 
developing countries and high risk of expropriation, the adverse effect of BITs on 
governance of international capital flows, i.e. FDI, is limited. This study contributes 
to the literature on institutions and international capital markets, as well as several 
others, and shows that it is not domestic legal institutions that explain lower than 
predicted levels of international capital flows to developing countries but it is their 
enforcement, hence it is governance that matters.   
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1 Global FDI Inflows and Bilateral Investment Treaties (1970-2008) 
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Table 1 US foreign affiliates in sample development countries (2008) 
 All Majority-owned 
Czech 
Republic 163 159 
Hungary 171 165 
Poland 219 211 
Russia 146 135 
Turkey 115 99 
Bulgaria 12 10 
Romania 55 53 
Slovakia 53 51 
Slovenia 14 14 
Argentina 263 244 
Brazil 609 568 
Chile 170 151 
Colombia 122 110 
Mexico 970 883 
Egypt 58 50 
South Africa 214 200 
Morocco 26 23 
China 947 868 
India 310 267 
Indonesia 165 154 
Korea 303 270 
Malaysia 220 206 
Philippines 150 134 
Thailand 222 200 
   
Source: US BEA  
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Table 2 Cumulative number of BITs and FDI stocks (end 2007) 
 BITs FDI Inward FDI Outward 
Common Law   
Australia 20 508.1 402.2 
India 61 197.9 92.4 
Malaysia 67 101.3 96.7 
New Zealand 4 70.1 17.6 
South Africa 41 132.4 81.1 
Thailand 42 127.3 25.4 
UK 102 1086.1 1689.3 
US 48 3451.4 4843.3 
Total  5674.6 7248 
French Law origin   
Argentina 56 86.7 29.8 
Belgium 77 351.5 736.7 
Brazil 15 472.6 180.9 
Chile 53 139.5 49.8 
Colombia 6 82.4 22.7 
Egypt 91 73 5.4 
France 103 1008.4 1523 
Indonesia 44 121.5 1.7 
Italy 83 337.4 475.6 
Mexico 23 327.2 66.2 
Netherlands 105 589.8 890.2 
Philippines 29 24.9 6.6 
Portugal 45 110.2 64.3 
Spain 61 614.5 660.1 
Turkey 73 181.9 23.8 
Romania 84 70 1.5 
Russia 50 423.1 433.7 
Total  5014.6 5172 
German Law origin   
Austria 65 155.9 169.7 
Germany 147 674.2 1421 
Japan 11 214.9 831 
South Korea 68 127 139 
Switzerland 127 539 909.4 
China 90 578.8 297.6 
Czech Republic 79 129.9 15.5 
Hungary 58 91.9 20.7 
Poland 62 193.1 36.8 
Bulgaria 54 47.9 1.5 
Slovak Rep 40 50.7 2.8 
Slovenia 36 15 7.6 
Total  2818.3 3852.6 
Scandinavian   
Finland 62 82.7 130.6 
Denmark 43 139.2 194.9 
Norway 16 171.8 170.5 
Sweden 66 348.7 336 
World  19140.6 20408.3 
Developing 2278 5951.2 3131.8 
Source: ICSID, UNCTAD, FDI stocks (in billion USD)  
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Table 3 Average Treatment Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Bilateral FDI 
outflows Panel Fixed Effects with source country- time dummies 
 I II III IV V 
ln GDP 
jt
 0.73 
(0.19)*** 
-0.90 
(1.36) 
0.87 
(0.22)*** 
0.85 
(0.21)*** 
0.66 
(1.50) 
ln market 
capitalization 
0.15 
(0.05)*** 
0.10 
(0.06) 
0.14 
(0.06)*** 
0.13 
(0.05)** 
0.12 
(0.07) 
BIT
 ijt
  0.27 
(0.13)** 
0.29 
(0.13)** 
0.37 
(0.14)*** 
0.31 
(0.14)** 
0.41 
(0.15)*** 
ln GDP per 
capita
 jt
 
 1.64 
(1.35) 
  0.27 
(1.47) 
ln(growth)
 jt
   0.02 
(0.07) 
 -0.01 
(0.08) 
ln(inflation)
 jt
    -0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
Within R2 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.44 
N 1161 1161 1079 1133 1051 
F value 13.51 
(0.00) 
14.30 
(0.00) 
2995.53 
(0.00) 
13.60 
(0.00) 
84.03 
(0.00) 
Time 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source 
country-time 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non 
significant coefficient. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 4 BITs and Unilateral FDI reform process 
 I II III IV V 
ln GDP 
jt
 0.71 
(0.20)*** 
0.48 
(0.24)** 
0.72 
(0.19)*** 
0.73 
(0.19)*** 
0.43 
(0.21)** 
ln market 
capitalization 
0.15 
(0.05)*** 
0.18 
(0.05)*** 
0.15 
(0.05)*** 
0.15 
(0.05)*** 
0.13 
(0.05)*** 
BIT
 ijt
  0.27 
(0.13)** 
0.25 
(0.14)* 
0.27 
(0.14)** 
0.28 
(0.13)** 
0.28 
(0.13)** 
Financial 
openness 
0.04 
(0.05) 
    
ln(privatization)
 
jt
 
 0.10 
(0.04)*** 
   
POLITY   -0.01 
(0.02) 
  
RTA
ijt
    -0.09 
(0.14) 
 
Ln(trade)
ijt
     0.50 
(0.16)*** 
     
      
Within R2 0.42 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45 
N 1148 1072 1161 1161 1150 
F value 78.66 
(0.00) 
12.55 
(0.00) 
13.66 
(0.00) 
13.29 
(0.00) 
13.06 
(0.00) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non 
significant coefficient. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 5 Sensitivity to sub-samples 
 
 
I II III 
Ln GDP 
jt
 0.78 
(0.20)*** 
0.74 
(0.19)*** 
0.73 
(0.20)*** 
ln market 
capitalization 
0.11 
(0.06)* 
0.14 
(0.05)*** 
0.15 
(0.05)*** 
BIT 0.28 
(0.13)** 
0.28 
(0.13)** 
0.27 
(0.13)** 
EU 
membership 
0.44 
(0.33) 
  
EU*BIT 
 
US*BIT 
-0.12 
(0.34) 
  
 
0.01 
(0.34) 
    
OECD 
member 
 0.31 
(0.26) 
 
OECD*BIT  0.01 
(0.28) 
 
    
    
Within R2 0.45 0.45 0.44 
N 1161 1161 1161 
F value 13.14 
(0.00) 
13.70 
(0.00) 
13.38 
(0.00) 
Time 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non 
significant coefficient. 
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Table 6 Robustness check-BITs and host-time and source-time controls 
 I II 
BIT 0.26 
(0.14)* 
0.65 
(0.27)** 
BIT
-1
  -0.45 
(0.26)* 
BIT
+1
   
Source-
country 
*time 
dummies 
Yes Yes   
Host-
country*time 
dummies 
Yes Yes   
   
Bilateral 
fixed-effects 
Yes Yes 
   
Within R2 0.57 0.46 
N 1241 941 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non 
significant coefficient. 
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Table 7 FDI, Host Domestic Legal Institutions and BITs  Random effects GLS 
 I II III IV V VI 
ln GDP 
jt
 0.71 
(0.08)*** 
0.70 
(0.08)*** 
0.73 
(0.08)*** 
0.71 
(0.08)*** 
0.71 
(0.08)*** 
0.71 
(0.08)*** 
ln market 
capitalization 
0.16 
(0.04)*** 
0.16 
(0.04)*** 
0.15 
(0.04)*** 
0.15 
(0.04)*** 
0.16 
(0.04)*** 
0.15 
(0.04)*** 
BIT
 ijt
  0.22 
(0.11)** 
0.22 
(0.11)** 
0.22 
(0.11)** 
0.21 
(0.11)** 
0.23 
(0.11)** 
0.21 
(0.11)** 
Ln(dist) -0.94 
(0.08)*** 
-0.97 
(0.08)*** 
-0.98 
(0.09)*** 
-0.95 
(0.08)*** 
-0.96 
(0.08)*** 
-0.92 
(0.11)*** 
Common 
language 
1.17 
(0.47)** 
1.20 
(0.44)*** 
1.13 
(0.44)*** 
1.21 
(0.47)*** 
1.08 
(0.42)*** 
1.15 
(0.44)*** 
Common
j
 -0.12 
(0.19) 
     
French
j
  0.19 
(0.14) 
    
German
j
   -0.12 
(0.16) 
   
Common
ij
    -0.17 
(0.44) 
  
French
ij
     0.45 
(0.23)** 
 
German
ij
      0.26 
(0.31) 
Overall adj-R2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.60 
Within 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Between 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
N 1161 1161 1161 1161 1161 1161 
F value 11667.2 11752.0 12176.9 10321.0 11781.6 12818.9 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non 
significant coefficient. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
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Table 8 BIT substitution effect for weak domestic property rights 
 RE RE RE 
ln GDP 
jt
 0.70 
(0.08)*** 
0.70 
(0.08)*** 
0.72 
(0.08)*** 
ln market 
capitalization 
0.16 
(0.04)*** 
0.16 
(0.04)*** 
0.15 
(0.04)*** 
ln(dist) -0.95 
(0.08)*** 
-0.97 
(0.08)*** 
-0.99 
(0.09)*** 
Common 
language 
1.19 
(0.44)*** 
1.20 
(0.44)*** 
1.14 
(0.45)*** 
BIT
 ijt
  0.15 
(0.12) 
0.25 
(0.13)* 
0.25 
(0.15*** 
BIT*Common
j
 
 
0.28 
(0.22) 
  
BIT*French
j
 
 
 -0.05 
(0.18) 
 
BIT*German
j
   -0.12 
(0.21) 
Common law
j
 -0.25 
(0.34) 
  
French law
j
  0.21 
(0.18) 
 
German law
j
   -0.05 
(0.20) 
Overall adj-R2 0.60 0.60 0.60 
Within 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Between 0.65 0.65 0.65 
N 1161 1161 1161 
Time 
dummies 
yes yes Yes 
Source-
country time 
dummies 
yes yes Yes 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non 
significant coefficient. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
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Table 9 FDI and legal governance-Panel fixed-effects 
 I II III IV V VI 
BIT
 ijt
  0.26 
(0.14)* 
0.26 
(0.15)* 
0.31 
(0.18)* 
0.50 
(0.23)** 
0.30 
(0.19) 
0.05 
(0.18) 
Sovereign 
risk 
 0.06 
(0.04)* 
    
Property 
rights 
  0.00 
(0.01) 
   
Shareholder 
rights 
   81.56 
(83.39) 
  
Rule of law     2.21 
(0.55)*** 
 
Expropriatio
n 
     0.33 
(0.17)** 
       
Within R2 0.57 0.52 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.49 
N 1241 1119 916 764 855 830 
Source-
country 
*time 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Host-
country*time 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bilateral FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
*** denotes significance at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%, - non 
significant coefficient. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for European Studies 
